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The National Popular Vote Compact:
Horizontal Federalism and the Proper Role
of Congress Under the Compact Clause
Heather Green*
INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 2011, California became the ninth United States
jurisdiction to pass the “Agreement Among the States to Elect the President
by National Popular Vote” (NPV agreement).1 Once the NPV agreement
receives the equivalent of at least 270 electoral votes,2 the traditional
Electoral College will be overhauled in favor of a national popular vote for
the President of the United States.3 Specifically, member states like
California will be bound to abandon the widely used practice of selecting
electors based on the outcome of the statewide vote.4 Instead, state electors
will be chosen in favor of the candidate winning the most votes nationally.5
Until August of 2011, the NPV agreement had obtained less than thirty
percent of the 270 vote total.6 With the addition of California’s fifty-five
electors, the agreement now has nearly fifty percent of the votes required to
become effective.7
*
J.D. Candidate 2013, Chapman University School of Law. The author would like to gratefully
acknowledge the tireless assistance of her faculty advisor, Lawrence Rosenthal. She would also like to
thank Evan Cote and her family for their support and encouragement throughout the writing process.
1 See 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 188 (West); see also Ben Boychuk & Pia Lopez, Head to Head:
Has the Time Come for the States to Help Fix the Electoral College?, SACRAMENTO B EE, Aug. 10,
2011, http://www.sacbee.com/2011/08/10/3827460/head-to-head-has-the-time-come.html (reporting
that California joined “seven other states and the District of Columbia in the National Popular Vote
compact”).
2 See infra text accompanying note 33 (discussing when the NPV becomes effective).
3 See J OHN R. KOZA ET AL., E VERY V OTE E QUAL : E LECTING THE P RESIDENT BY
NATIONAL POPULAR V OTE 248 (2011) (indicating that Article III of the NPV agreement requires that
the election official from each member state “shall certify the appointment in that official’s own state of
the elector slate nominated in that state in association with the national popular vote winner”).
4 See infra text accompanying note 160.
5 See KOZA ET AL ., supra note 3, at 248 (explaining that under Article III of the NPV
agreement, member states must base their choice of electors on the “national popular vote total”
determined by the “number of votes for each presidential slate in each State of the United States and in
the District of Columbia”).
6 See David Siders, Jerry Brown Signs Popular Vote Bill, S ACRAMENTO B EE , Aug. 8, 2011,
http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2011/08/jerry-brown-signs-popular-vote.html (reporting that
before California passed the NPV agreement, the seven other states and the District of Columbia, which
had already passed NPV legislation, committed seventy-four of the 270 total electoral votes needed).
7 See id. (explaining that California added fifty-five electoral votes to the NPV agreement when
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Although all past attempts to implement popular or direct presidential
elections have failed to obtain the support needed for a successful
constitutional amendment,8 the NPV agreement presents an alternative
means of achieving electoral reform. Relying on the power given to the
states under Article II of the Constitution,9 the NPV agreement avoids the
amendment requirements by regulating the selection of electors at the state
level.10 Proponents believe that the NPV agreement will make every vote
in every state equally important,11 increasing the significance of
uncompetitive states like California that are largely ignored in presidential
elections.12 The creators also intended that the NPV agreement would
avoid situations in which presidential candidates win the presidential
election without winning the popular vote.13 However, the NPV agreement
will also radically alter both the traditional method for electing the
President and the distribution of voting power among the states.14
This comment focuses on the validity of the NPV agreement under the
Compact Clause.15 The text of the Clause requires that, in order to be
valid, interstate agreements and compacts must obtain the consent of
Congress.16 The Supreme Court’s interpretation has narrowed the Clause,

it passed the NPV legislation in August 2011).
8 See N EAL R. P EIRCE , THE P EOPLE ’ S P RESIDENT : T HE E LECTORAL C OLLEGE IN
AMERICAN H ISTORY AND THE D IRECT -VOTE ALTERNATIVE 151 (1968) (noting that there have been
over 500 attempts in Congress to amend the constitutional provision for the Electoral College); Shlomo
Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc Congress for the Selection
of the President, 73 AM. H IST . 35, 35 (1986) (“Close to seven hundred proposals to amend the
Electoral College scheme have been introduced into Congress since the Constitution was inaugurated in
1789.”); L. P AIGE WHITAKER & T HOMAS H. NEALE , C ONG . R ESEARCH SERV., RL 30804, THE
E LECTORAL C OLLEGE : AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF R EFORM PROPOSALS 17 (2004)
(indicating that most of the proposed amendments “had minimal legislative activity,” but some failed
due to “insufficient legislative support”); see, also, Lodge-Gossett Amendment, S.J. Res. 200, 80th
Cong. (1948) (proposing proportional allocation of electoral votes based on the number of votes cast in
each state, but failing to pass the House). A successful constitutional amendment requires the support of
two-thirds of both the House and the Senate. See U.S. C ONST . art. V.
9 See U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (allowing state legislatures to appoint electors in any way
they may choose).
10 See infra Part I.
11 See KOZA ET AL ., supra note 3, at 245 (indicating that a national popular vote is the only
electoral approach that achieves equality in voting).
12 Siders, supra note 6 (reporting that “proponents say the agreement would make California
more relevant in presidential elections”); Ralph Z. Hallow, GOP Factions Unite Against Presidential
Popular
Vote
Push,
WASHINGTON
T IMES,
Aug.
2,
2011,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/2/gop-factions-unite-against-president-popularvote/?page=all (indicating that supporters believe that the NPV agreement “would ‘guarantee that every
vote matters’”).
13 See
California: Brown Signs Electoral College Revision, N.Y.
T IMES,
Aug.
8,
2011,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/us/
09brfsBROWNSIGNSELBRF.html?r=1&ref=electoralcollege (reporting that the “National Popular
Vote[] seeks to prevent a repeat of 2000, when Al Gore won the popular vote[,] but George W. Bush
won the electoral vote”); KOZA ET AL, supra note 3, at 245 (positing that the NPV agreement would
“ensure the election to the Presidency of the candidate with the most popular votes nationwide”).
14 See infra Part II.C.
15 See U.S. C ONST . art I, § 10, cl. 3 (defining the Compact Clause).
16 Id.
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requiring congressional approval only when an interstate compact
encroaches on the power of the federal government.17 However, the
question of whether the NPV agreement requires congressional consent is
unclear. While it does not involve federal encroachment, it does interfere
with the voting power of nonmember states, an issue which has never been
squarely decided by the Supreme Court.18 In addition, the power given to
states under Article II of the United States Constitution to determine the
method by which electors are selected is not subject to congressional
interference.19 Thus, a conflict between the two constitutional provisions
leaves the legitimacy of the NPV agreement open to debate.
In Part I, this comment explores the provisions of the NPV agreement,
its history, and the rationale behind it.20 Part II addresses the need for
congressional consent under the text of the Compact Clause, the Supreme
Court’s narrower interpretation of the Clause, and the absence of a
conclusive decision from the Court regarding encroachment on nonmember
states.21 Part III then investigates the conflict between Article II and the
Compact Clause regarding the proper role of Congress in determining the
validity of the NPV agreement.22 Part III concludes that the NPV
agreement is subject to congressional approval. The NPV agreement not
only increases the voting power of signatory states while encroaching upon
the power of nonmember states, but also falls within the plain meaning of
the Compact Clause.23
I. THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE AGREEMENT
The NPV agreement is unique in its state level approach. Instead of
abolishing the Electoral College, it avoids the difficulties in passing an
amendment by enacting popular vote legislation to individual state
legislatures, and regulates the state’s Article II power to determine how
electors are selected.24 Section A examines the provisions of the NPV
legislation introduced, and in some cases, passed by state legislatures.
Section B investigates the origins of the NPV agreement and its adoption in
a number of states. In Section C, the rationale behind the NPV agreement
and why it has been embraced in particular states is discussed.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.B.
See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election of the President: Using or Abusing the Electoral
College?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 218, 218 (2008) (indicating that the NPV agreement relies on state power
over selection of electors to establish a “state-by-state path to a National Popular Vote”).
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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A.

The Mechanics of the NPV Agreement
The NPV does not eliminate the Electoral College, but it does
significantly change how the electors are chosen.25 The Constitution grants
the states the power to determine the method by which electors are
chosen,26 and traditionally, states have chosen to select electors based on
the outcome of a statewide popular vote.27 The NPV agreement, on the
other hand, lays out a number of provisions requiring that signatory states
select presidential electors based on the outcome of the popular vote at the
national level.28
These provisions would require that each state conduct a statewide
popular vote similar to that under the current Electoral College system.29
Then the votes from the individual states would be counted and combined
by election officials in each member state to produce an official national
popular vote total.30 Each of those states that have adopted the NPV
agreement would be bound to choose electors based on this total.31 In the
event of a tie in the national vote, each signatory state would revert to
choosing its electors based on the winner of the statewide popular vote.32
The NPV agreement does not immediately bind the choices of the
signatory states, however. Instead, it will become effective only after
enough states approve it to make up at least 270 electoral votes, or a
majority of the Electoral College.33 In addition, an important limitation is

25 See KOZA ET AL ., supra note 3, at 247 (explaining that while “[t]he Electoral College would
remain intact under the proposed compact,” it would change it to “a body that reflects the voters’
nationwide choice”).
26 U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl 2.
27 See infra text accompanying note 53 (defining this method as the unit rule); see also note 160
(describing the use of the unit rule by nearly every state and the District of Columbia).
28 See KOZA ET AL ., supra note 3, at 248 (indicating that Article III of the NPV agreement
requires that the election official from each member state shall certify the appointment in that official’s
own state of the elector slate nominated in that state in association with the national popular vote
winner).
29 See id. at 250 (requiring that “[e]ach member state shall conduct a statewide popular election
for the President and Vice President of the United States.”).
30 See id. at 252–53 (“[T]he chief election official of each member state shall determine the
number of votes for each presidential slate in each State of the United States and in the District of
Columbia in which votes have been cast in a statewide popular election and shall add such votes
together to produce a ‘national popular vote total’ for each presidential slate.”).
31 See id. at 250 (describing states as the members to the “Agreement Among the States to Elect
the President by National Popular Vote” which “mandates a popular election for President and Vice
President”).
32 See id. at 248.
33 See id. at 249 (reporting that under Article IV of the agreement, the agreement “shall take
effect when states cumulatively possessing a majority of the electoral votes have enacted [the]
[a]greement in substantially the same form”); Press Release, John Buchanan, Congressman, Prepared
Remarks for Initial Press Conference of National Popular Vote at National Press Club in Washington
(Feb 23, 2006) (on file with National Popular Vote) (indicating that the laws will only “come to life”
once “identical laws have been enacted by states collectively possessing a majority of the electoral
votes”); Hendrik Hertzberg, Count ‘Em, THE NEW YORKER , Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.newyorker.com/
archive/2006/03/06/060306tatalkhertzberg (“The compact would take effect only when enough states
had joined it to elect a President . . . .”).
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placed upon each signatory state’s ability to repeal the NPV agreement. In
an effort to prevent states from freely withdrawing solely to select electors
in a way “better suited [to] their political preferences,”34 the NPV
agreement creates a “blackout” period.35 Any withdrawal from the NPV
agreement taking place within the six months before the end of a
President’s term is not effective until after the election for the next
presidential term has concluded.36 Thus, if a state wishes to vote for a
candidate who better represents its interests but is likely to lose in the
national popular vote, it must repeal the NPV legislation before July 20 of
an election year.37 If it misses this deadline, that state may not repeal the
NPV legislation until after inauguration day.38
B.

The History and State Approval of the NPV Agreement
Law professor Robert W. Bennett introduced the proposal for a stateimplemented shift from the electoral system to a national popular vote
without the burdens of a constitutional amendment in the wake of the
highly controversial 2000 presidential election.39 In 2005, entrepreneur
John R. Koza founded the National Popular Vote Movement to advocate
for the legislative adoption of Bennett’s proposal.40 By 2008, the NPV
agreement was introduced in forty-seven state legislatures.41 Maryland was
34 Question Concerning Withdrawal from the National Popular Vote Compact, N ATIONAL
POPULAR
VOTE
(Mar.
13,
2010)
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/
resources/Withdrawal-V6-2010-3-13.pdf; see also KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 266 (indicating that
the purpose of the withdrawal provision is to prevent states from withdrawing in the middle of a
campaign for possibly partisan purposes).
35 See KOZA ET AL ., supra note 3, at 265 (explaining that the NPV agreement “permits a state to
withdraw from the compact but provides for a ‘blackout’ period (of approximately six months)
restricting withdrawals”).
36 See id. at 266 (describing the purpose of the withdrawal limitation as an attempt to prevent
withdrawal for “partisan political purposes”); see also id. at 249 (indicating that Article IV of the
agreement prevents withdrawal “occurring six months or less before the end of a President’s term shall
not become effective until a President or Vice President shall have been qualified to serve the next
term”); Paul Casey, Is It Time For Electoral Reform?, WICKED LOCAL STONEHAM (Sept. 24, 2007,
3:35 PM) http://www.wickedlocal.com/stoneham/opinion/x775330870#axzz1cww2X6WA (“[S]tates
could withdraw from the agreement at any time except during a six-month window between July 20 of
an election year and inauguration day.”).
37 See KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 266 (“The blackout period starts July 20 of a presidential
election year . . . .”).
38 See id. (explaining that the blackout period “would normally end on January 20 of the
following year (the scheduled inauguration date)”).
39 See Robert W. Bennett, Popular Election of the President without a Constitutional
Amendment, 4 GREEN B AG 2d 241, 241 (2001).
40 See Andrew Ferguson, The Head Counter: John Koza has an Ingenious Plan to Put the
Electoral College Out of Business, FORTUNE, July 21, 2008, at 119, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2008/07/21; Rick Lyman, Innovator Devises
End
Run
Around
Electoral
College,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
22,
2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/us/politics/22electoral.html; Stevenson Swanson, Turning
Election into Popularity Race, C HI. TRIB ., July 21, 2008, at A18, available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-07-21/news.
41 Maryland Sidesteps Electoral College, MSNBC
(Apr. 10, 2007, 11:17 AM)
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18053715/ns/politics/t/maryland-sidesteps-electoralcollege/#.TwfNHzXVujY.
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the first state to formally adopt the NPV agreement in 2007,42 followed by
New Jersey,43 Illinois,44 and Hawaii in 2008,45 Washington in 2009,46
Massachusetts47 and the District of Columbia in 2010,48 and Vermont49 and
California in 2011.50 With the addition of California’s fifty-five electoral
votes, the agreement has successfully obtained 132 of the 270 electoral
votes needed for the agreement to become effective.51
C.

Rationale Behind the Agreement and State Approval
The advocates for the NPV agreement cite three main reasons for
national popular vote election as opposed to traditional election by the
Electoral College.52 First, they believe that under the unit rule system,53
individual votes are virtually worthless unless the voter lives in a highly
contested state where an individual vote could tip the scale toward one
candidate or another.54 Second, the unit rule has been seen as the cause of
candidates spending a disproportionate amount of time and resources in
competitive states while the remaining states are largely ignored.55 Finally,
national popular vote advocates often cite the ability of the traditional
See MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-5A-01 (LexisNexis 2007).
See.N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:36-4 (West 2008).
See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/1 (West 2009).
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14D-1 (LexisNexis 2008).
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.56.300 (West 2009).
47 See 2010 Mass. Acts 229.
48 See D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (LexisNexis 2010).
49 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2751 (2011).
50 See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6921 (West 2011).
51 See Nate Silver, Pa. Electoral College Plan Could Backfire on G.O.P., N.Y. T IMES, (Sept. 15,
2011,
11:56
PM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/
pennsylvania-electoral-college-plan-could-backfire-on-g-o-p.
52 The creators of the NPV agreement identify “accuracy,” “competitiveness,” and “equality” as
the three criteria by which they analyze both the Electoral College and the NPV agreement. See KOZA
ET AL., supra note 3, at 245. “Accuracy” is defined as the ability to “ensure the election to the
Presidency of the candidate with the most popular votes nationwide.” Id. “Competitiveness” is the
ability of the electoral method to “improve upon the current situation in which voters in two-thirds of
the states are ignored because they live in presidentially non-competitive states.” Id. “Equality” is
defined as the ability of the method to make “every vote . . . equal.” Id. The creators argue that the NPV
agreement is the only method that meets all three criteria. Id.
53 The unit rule describes the state initiated practice of “aggregating a state’s electoral votes as a
unit” on a general ticket. See Matthew J. Festa, The Origins and Constitutionality of State Unit Voting
in the Electoral College, 54 VAND . L. R EV. 2099, 2124 (2001) (describing the origination of the unit
rule in the presidential election of 1800); see also infra text accompanying note 160 (explaining the
nearly universal use of the unit rule by states today).
54 KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 243.
55 See Jack N. Rakove, Presidential Selection: Electoral Fallacies, 119 POL. S CI. Q. 21, 23
(2004) (noting that under the current electoral system, candidates are able to focus their scarce
resources on a “relatively small number of electoral units that are in serious contention”); Brenden J.
Doherty, Elections: The Politics of the Permanent Campaign: Presidential Travel and the Electoral
College, 1977–2004, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 749, 750 (2007) (recognizing the assumption
made by some that candidates, specifically incumbents, are “single-minded seekers of reelection” who
will inherently spend more time in the states with the most political value); Daron R. Shaw, The
Methods behind the Madness: Presidential Electoral College Strategies, 1988–1996, 61 J. POL. 893,
911 (1999) (positing that candidates allocate resources based on systematic planning and strategy under
the electoral college).
42
43
44
45
46
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Electoral College system to elect a President who failed to win the
nationwide popular vote, as inconsistent with democratic ideology.56
State legislatures have recognized similar rationale. Those that have
passed the NPV legislation have especially emphasized campaign attention
and the power of individual voters as justification for enactment of the
NPV agreement.57 Indeed, the importance of these factors is supported by
an examination of the states that have passed the NPV legislation.58 So far,
none of the signatory states are currently considered “battleground” states
thought to receive the most resources and voting power.59 Instead, many of
them are thought to be “spectator” states receiving the least amount of
campaign attention and where the statewide vote is typically not
competitive.60
II. THE NPV AGREEMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
The NPV agreement has been challenged and extensively analyzed by
critics on various grounds including the Voting Rights Act61 and the
Guaranty Clause.62
This comment focuses on the most serious
constitutional objection facing the NPV agreement: whether it requires
56 See Keena Lipsitz, The Consequences of Battleground and “Spectator” State Residency for
Political Participation, 31 POL. B EHAV . 187, 187–88 (2008) (noting that “George W. Bush’s ability to
win the 2000 presidential election without winning the popular vote reinvigorated calls for abolishing
the Electoral College” and that those dissatisfied with the Electoral College have begun to support a
national popular vote); see also Randall E. Adkins & Kent A. Kirwan, What Role Does the “Federalism
Bonus” Play in Presidential Selection?, 32 PUBLIUS : J. OF FEDERALISM 71, 71 (2002) (observing that
after close election in 2000, politicians began advocating elimination or revision of the Electoral
College); Bonnie J. Johnson, Identities of Competitive States in U.S. Presidential Elections: Electoral
College Bias or Candidate-Centered Politics?, 35 PUBLIUS : J. OF FEDERALISM 337, 337–38 (2005)
(indicating that both the 2000 election of George W. Bush and the very narrow 1888 election of
Benjamin Harrison triggered questions about the validity of the Electoral College and that under a
national democracy, the President should be elected by popular vote).
57 See H.R. R EP . N O . 111-5599, at 1 (2009) (identifying the fact that “[t]he current system
forces candidates to focus only on a few states” and the supporters’ belief that the agreement “will
involve more citizens in presidential campaigns”); M D . DEPT . OF LEGIS. SERVS., Md. Fiscal and
Policy Note, H.R. 148, 2007 Sess., at 1 (2007) (discussing the “concentration of campaigning in a
minority of closely divided states and the ability of a candidate to win the presidency without winning
the national popular vote”); ASSEMB . APPROPRIATIONS C OMM., NEW JERSEY ASSEMBLY
C OMMITTEE STATEMENT , Leg., 212, A.B. 4225 (2007) (“This agreement ensures that all states are
competitive in presidential elections, makes all votes important and equal . . . .”).
58 See supra text accompanying notes 42–50 (listing the states that have successfully passed the
NPV agreement).
59 See Johnson supra note 56, at 337 (defining competitive states as those with “margins of
victory of less than [five] percentage points”); see also Election Results 2008, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9,
2008), http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/map.html (reporting that the margins of
victory for the eight states and the District of Columbia, which approved the agreement, ranged from a
low of fifteen to a high of ninety-four percentage points).
60 See Doherty, supra note 55, at 766 (concluding that closer voting margins are among the
factors that contribute to the number of campaign events in a given state, with closer margins leading,
on average, to more events).
61 See David Gringer, Why the National Popular Vote Plan is the Wrong Way to Abolish the
Electoral College, 108 C OLUM . L. R EV. 182, 183 (2008).
62 See Kristin Feeley, Guaranteeing a Federally Elected President, 103 N W . U. L. R EV . 1427,
1434 (2009).
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congressional approval under the Compact Clause. Unlike other possible
constitutional challenges, a Compact Clause challenge to the NPV
agreement highlights a tension between the Article II power of states on
one hand to select presidential electors and the power of Congress on the
other hand to approve interstate compacts.63
The text of the Compact Clause states that “[n]o State shall, without
the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State.”64 This clause applies, on its face, to all compacts or
agreements made between states, but the Supreme Court has held that the
Clause only applies to agreements found to encroach upon federal power.65
The Supreme Court recognized that interstate agreements can be helpful or
even necessary to solve interstate problems, and to require congressional
consent for all such compacts would be unwise.66 The Court has not,
however, squarely considered the need for congressional consent when
interstate compacts horizontally encroach or interfere with the power of
other nonmember states.67 This Part explores the NPV agreement under the
original meaning of the Compact Clause and the Court’s interpretation, and
examines the possible need for congressional consent due to the
agreement’s effects on non-signatory states. Section A addresses whether
the NPV agreement qualifies as a compact or agreement within the
meaning of the Compact Clause. Section B then examines the need for
congressional consent under the accepted federal encroachment test.
Finally, Section C considers a possible horizontal encroachment test.
A.

The NPV Agreement is a Compact
Before the Compact Clause may be applied, it must first be
determined whether the NPV agreement qualifies as a compact or
agreement within the meaning of the Clause. The Constitution does not
clearly define these terms.68 For instance, there was no discussion at the
See infra Part III.
U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976) (“The application of the Compact
Clause is limited to agreements that are ‘[d]irected to the formation of any combination tending to the
increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy
of the United States.’” (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893))).
66 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 470 (1978) (finding that the
Constitution “is not to be construed to limit the variety of arrangements which are not possible through
the voluntary and cooperative actions of individual States with a view to increasing harmony within the
federalism created by the Constitution” (quoting New York v. O’Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959))).
67 See infra Part II.B.
68 See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 694 (1925) (“The records of the Constitutional Convention
furnish no light as to the source and scope of this compact provision of Article I, Section 10. Nor does
the Federalist help.”). Because the Clause largely mirrors that used under the Articles of Confederation,
the Court has found that the purpose of the Clause is to protect the federal government from competing
state political power. See infra Part II.B. This argument is bolstered by the text of the Clause which
places the same limitations on interstate compacts as “keep[ing] Troops” and “engag[ing] in War,”
powers specifically granted as enumerated powers of the federal government. U.S. C ONST . art I, § 10
(describing the state’s limited ability to enter into interstate compacts); U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 8
63
64
65
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Constitutional Convention of the use of the phrase “agreement or compact”
rather than the “treaty, confederation, or alliance” phrase used in the
Articles of Confederation to describe interstate agreements allowed with
congressional consent.69 James Madison declared that the purpose of the
inclusion of the Clause was so obvious that it required no discussion.70
Therefore, the best indication of the original meaning of these terms may
be found in the earliest edition of the Webster’s Dictionary.71 It defines a
compact as “an agreement [or] a contract between parties; a word that may
be applied, in a general sense, to any covenant or contract between
individuals, but it is more generally applied to agreements between nations
and states, as treaties and confederacies.”72 It defines agreement as a
“[u]nion of minds in regard to a transfer of interest; bargain; compact;
contract; stipulation.”73 Under these definitions, to qualify as an agreement
or compact, the NPV agreement must be a kind of contract between
individual states.74
To be a valid and enforceable contract, an agreement must involve a
“bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange
and a consideration.”75 Mutual assent requires that the parties to an
agreement either “make a promise or begin or render a performance.”76
Finally, to satisfy the consideration requirement, parties to a contract must
give “performance or return promise [that] is bargained for.”77 In applying
contract law to interstate compacts, courts have found that presentation of
(describing the enumerated powers of Congress including the ability to “declare War,” “raise and
support Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy”).
69 See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX . L. R EV . 741, 761 (2010)
(explaining that “agreement or compact” was introduced in a draft of the Constitution and then
continued to be used without any discussion).
70 See THE F EDERALIST N O . 44, at 783 (James Madison) (explaining that with the exception of
the limitations upon state power over imports and exports, “the remaining particulars of [Article I,
Section 10] . . . are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over
without remark”).
71 AMERICAN D ICTIONARY OF THE E NGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1828).
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 Courts have also recognized compacts as contracts between signatory states. See Tex. v. N.M.,
482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987) (“[A] Compact is, after all, a contract.” (quoting Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge
Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1959))); Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 105 (3d Cir.
2008) (finding that “[i]nterstate compacts are formal agreements between states, and hence, are
contracts subject to the principles of contract law.”); Spence-Parker v. Del. River & Bay Auth., 616 F.
Supp. 2d 509, 515 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding that “[t]he terms of a state’s surrender of a portion of its
sovereignty to a compact clause entity are found in the compact agreement itself, which is a ‘contract[ ]
subject to the principles of contract law.’” (quoting Doe, 513 F.3d at 105)); Aveline v. Pa. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole, 729 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (finding that “[b]ecause interstate compacts are
agreements enacted into state law, they function simultaneously as contracts between states and as
statutes within those states.”). In applying contract law to interstate compacts, it has been found that the
presentation of reciprocal legislation represents an offer, approval by the state legislature represents
acceptance, and “the settlement of a dispute or the creation of a regulatory scheme” satisfies
consideration. Doe, 513 F.3d at 105.
75 R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF C ONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981).
76 Id. § 18.
77 Id. § 71(2).
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reciprocal legislation is an offer, approval by the state legislature represents
acceptance, and the regulation or settlement of a dispute by the states
satisfies consideration.78
By considering and formally enacting the NPV legislation, state
legislatures meet the requirement for manifestation of mutual assent.79
Also, when enough states enact the legislation, each state promises not only
to abide by the terms of the agreement in selecting state electors based on
the outcome of a national popular vote, but also to sacrifice its ability to
withdraw from the agreement during the six months preceding the
inauguration of the President, establishing consideration for the
agreement.80 Therefore, the NPV agreement qualifies as a compact within
the meaning of the Compact Clause under contract law and the original
meaning of the term.
The Supreme Court has used a set of factors to determine if an
interstate agreement comes within the meaning of the Compact Clause.
The Court has looked to (1) mandated reciprocity or regional limitation, (2)
whether state legislation depends upon the actions of another state, or (3)
whether a state’s representatives or officials cooperate with those of other
signatory states.81
The NPV agreement satisfies the test for a compact within the
meaning of the Clause. As far as reciprocity or regional limitation, the NPV
agreement is national rather than regional in nature,82 and each state’s NPV
legislation depends on the actions of other states as it becomes effective
only after a specific number of states have enacted similar legislation.83
Finally, as far as cooperation among state officials, the NPV agreement
requires that the “chief election official[s]” of each state are to
“communicate an official statement of [the number of votes cast in the state

See Doe, 513 F.3d at 105.
See id.
See R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF C ONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (indicating that consideration is a
“performance or return promise [that] is bargained for” which includes “a forbearance”).
81 See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (expressing doubt as to
whether an interstate agreement that allowed regional banking amounted to a compact under the factor
test). A set of “classic indicia” was also used by the Court in recent cases in evaluating whether an
agreement amounted to a compact under the Clause. See id. The same indicia were introduced in earlier
cases in applying the federal encroachment test because the Court defined a compact as an agreement
encroaching on federal power, effectively collapsing compact analysis and the federal encroachment
test into this single set of factors. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472–
73 (1978) (indicating that to determine whether an agreement was a compact to which the Compact
Clause would apply is based on “whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National
Government”); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976) (disagreeing with the contention
that a marine boundary agreement was an “Agreement or Compact” under the Compact Clause due to
its failure to meet the federal encroachment test).
82 See KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 248 (stating that the text of the NPV agreement provides that
“any State in the United States and the District of Columbia may become a member of [the NPV]
agreement by enacting [the NPV] agreement”). The states that adopted the legislation are not confined
to any particular region of the country. See supra text accompanying notes 42–50.
83 See supra text accompanying note 33.
78
79
80
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for each presidential slate] . . . to the chief election official of each other
member state.”84 Because the NPV agreement meets all of the factors, the
NPV agreement would likely be found to be an interstate compact within
the meaning of the Compact Clause.
B.

The Vertical Federal Encroachment Test
Although the language of the Compact Clause seems to require broad
application,85 the Supreme Court has held that not every interstate compact
requires congressional consent.86 Instead, the Court has determined the
need for congressional consent using a test first introduced in Virginia v.
Tennessee.87 The Court considered a compact used to settle a state
boundary dispute and found that the compact did not violate the Compact
Clause because congressional consent could be implied from subsequent
recognition of the boundary.88 More importantly, Justice Field posited that
because “[t]here are many matters upon which different States may agree
that can in no respect concern the United States,” congressional approval
should only be required for “the formation of any combination tending to
the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”89 Thus, interstate
compacts only require congressional consent if they encroach upon the
power of the federal government.90
See id.; KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 248 (describing the terms of the agreement).
See U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (requiring congressional approval for “any” interstate
compact or agreement); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517–18 (1893) (acknowledging that “[t]he
terms ‘agreement’ or ‘compact’ taken by themselves are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all
forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects.”).
86 See Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 169 (1894) (holding that “the terms ‘compact’ or
‘agreement’ in the Constitution do not apply to every possible compact or agreement between one State
and another, for the validity of which the consent of Congress must be obtained.” (quoting Virginia, 148
U.S. at 518)); U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 469 (holding that “not all agreements between States are subject to
the strictures of the Compact Clause.”). The Supreme Court found that a literal reading of the Compact
Clause could not have been intended because it provided no benefit to the federal government. See
Union Branch R.R. Co. v. E. Tenn. & Ga. R.R. Co., 14 Ga. 327, 340 (1853) (explaining that if the court
was required to follow the exact language of the Compact Clause, it “must hold that a State, without the
consent of Congress, can make no sort of contract, whatever, with another State,” but concluded that it
was not meant to apply to every agreement between states because there is “no advantage to be gained
by, or benefit in such a provision”).
87 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
88 See id. at 522 (finding that “[t]he line established was treated by [Congress] as the true
boundary between the States” for elections, federal appointments, and judicial and revenue purposes).
89 See id. at 518–19; see also Ne. Bancorp, Inc., 472 U.S. at 175–76 (citing Justice Field’s test
when deciding the status of a regional banking agreement under the Compact Clause); U.S. Steel Corp.
v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 471(1978) (finding that the federal supremacy test proposed
in Va. v. Tenn. “states the proper balance between federal and state power with respect to compacts and
agreements among States”); N.H. v. Me., 426 U.S. 363, 369–70 (1976) (applying the test to evaluate a
compact regarding the marine boundary between the two states); Stearns v. Minn., 179 U.S. 223, 246–
47 (1900) (referring to the Virginia v. Tennessee rule in reviewing the validity of an agreement between
states regarding railroad taxation); La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. 1, 17 (1900) (citing the test in evaluating an
interstate railroad agreement).
90 See N.H., 426 U.S. at 369–70 (finding that whether a state boundary dispute fell under the
congressional approval requirement of the Compact Clause depended upon whether it “encroach[ed]
. . . upon the full and free exercise of Federal authority” (quoting Va. v. Tenn., 148 U.S. at 520)).
84
85
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The Court has developed a factor test for determining federal
encroachment by an interstate compact. It looks to (1) whether the
agreement gives states power they would not otherwise have, (2) whether
the agreement delegates state power to an outside body, (3) the ability of
each participating state to withdraw at will, or (4) whether the statute is
“conditioned on action by the other state[s].”91 Under these factors, the
NPV agreement does not involve federal encroachment. Article II gives
the federal government no power to determine the manner by which the
states choose electors.92 Instead, it leaves that choice to the states.93
Therefore, an interstate agreement concerning the selection of electors does
not give states any power they would not have otherwise and does not
encroach upon the power of the federal government. The power to use
reciprocal legislation to choose electors is not included in the language of
Article II, but collective action alone is not enough to prove federal
encroachment.94 In addition, the NPV agreement does not give regulating
power to any outside body or commission.95 Instead, an election official
from each participating state is given the duty to tally the popular votes
within the state for each candidate, report the vote totals to all other
participating states, and select electors for the state based on the final
outcome of the national popular vote.96
Although the last two factors weigh against the NPV agreement, they
are unlikely to prove conclusive in finding federal encroachment. First,
because repeal of the NPV agreement by participating states is prevented
during the six-month blackout period, states are not free to withdraw at any
time.97 Second, the fact that it becomes effective only after acquiring 270
electoral votes establishes that the NPV legislation in each state is
conditioned upon legislation in other states.98 However, these factors seem

91 See U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473 (identifying the factors as the “test [to analyze] whether the
Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government”). These factors have also been used in
more recent decisions to determine whether an agreement amounts to a compact. See also cases cited
supra note 74.
92 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) (noting that the Constitution “recognizes that
the people act through their representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively
to define the method of effecting the [appointment of electors]”).
93 See id.; U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (granting state legislatures the power to select
presidential electors in any way they choose).
94 See N.Y. v. O’Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 11 (1959) (indicating that not all interstate compacts
necessarily encroach on federal power because “[t]he Constitution of the United States does not
preclude resourcefulness of relationships between States on matters as to which there is no grant of
power to Congress and as to which the range of authority restricted within an individual State is
inadequate”).
95 See KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 247 (“The proposed compact does not change a state’s
internal procedures for operating a presidential election. After the [fifty] states and the District of
Columbia certify their popular vote counts for President in the usual way, a grand total of popular votes
would be calculated by adding up the popular vote count from all 51 jurisdictions.”).
96 See id. at 248 (indicating that the mechanics of the agreement are the duty of the chief election
official in each participating state).
97 See supra Part I.A.
98 See id.
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to only address the NPV agreement’s status as a compact rather than
whether it encroaches on the power of the federal government. The fact
that the states are not given any additional power beyond that already
retained under Article II and in no way “interfere with [the federal
government’s] rightful management of particular subjects placed under
their entire control” decisively forecloses the need for congressional
approval under the federal encroachment test.99
C.

Horizontal Encroachment and the Compact Clause
The NPV agreement presents an issue separate from federal
encroachment: whether congressional consent is required for interstate
compacts that encroach on state power. NPV advocates believe that under
the traditional unit rule system, voters in a majority of states are
disregarded during presidential elections in favor of the more influential
competitive states.100 The NPV agreement seeks to remedy this problem by
replacing unit voting with a national popular vote.101 Under this system,
voting power is expected to shift in favor of those states believed to be
ignored in current presidential elections.102 Indeed, many of the states that
have enacted the NPV legislation cited its ability to increase campaign
attention within those states in future elections.103 Thus, rather than
affecting the vertical distribution of power between the states and the
federal government, the NPV agreement affects the horizontal distribution
of power, benefitting safe states at the expense of the competitive, nonsignatory states that benefit from traditional presidential elections.
To analyze the voting power of the states, researchers have looked to
the amount of campaign time and resources spent in each state during a
presidential election.104 This method takes into account the basic

See Va. v. Tenn., 148 U.S. 503, 517–18 (1893).
See KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at xxiv (arguing that “[w]ith the number of battleground states
steadily shrinking, we see candidates and their campaigns focused on fewer and fewer states” and that
the candidates in the 2004 election “completely ignored three-quarters of the states”).
101 See supra Part I.A.
102 See 125 Cong. Rec. 309 (1979) (statement of Sen. Robert E. Dole) (postulating that if the
country switched to the direct election of the President, each vote would “carr[y] equal importance” and
“would give candidates incentive to campaign in States that are perceived to be single party States”).
103 See MD. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVICES, Md. Fiscal and Policy Note, S.B. 634, 2007 Sess., at 3
(2007) (reporting that the NPV agreement is “aimed at changing [certain] aspects of the current system
of electing the President, including the concentration of campaigning in a minority of closely divided
states”); N.J. ASSEMB . C OMM. S TATEMENT , A.B. 4225 (2007) (“This agreement ensures that all states
are competitive in presidential elections, [and] makes all votes important and equal.”); SB 5599, 2009
Leg. (Wash. 2009) (stating that “two-thirds of the campaign spending and visits in the last election were
focused only on five ‘swing’ states” and that “[t]his bill will allow all voters to count in a presidential
election”).
104 See Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis, The 3/2’s Rule in Presidential Campaigning, 68 AM .
POL. SCI. R EV. 113, 113 (1974) (analyzing how the Electoral College “induces candidates to allocate
campaign resources” so as to “create[] a peculiar bias in presidential campaigns that makes the largest
states the most attractive campaign targets to the candidates, even out of proportion to their size” while
a popular vote “would tend to relieve the candidates of the necessity of making some of the
manipulative strategic calculations that are endemic to the present system”); Shaw, supra note 55, at
99
100
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assumption that a candidate’s time and resources are limited.105
Consequently, they are expected to invest the most in the states likely to
yield the greatest vote return.106 The states in which candidates invest the
most are assumed to be the states with the most voting power.107
Under the unit rule system, candidates have been found to focus
mainly on large, competitive states that are more likely to be pivotal in any
given presidential election.108 Because the number of electors given to
each state depends upon the number of seats that state has in Congress,109
large states possess more electoral votes, increasing their chance of casting
the decisive vote.110 If a large state is also competitive, it becomes even
more powerful under the unit rule because it is more likely to tip the
electoral vote scale toward one candidate or another.111 At the other end of
the spectrum, the less populous, noncompetitive states are the least likely to
receive campaign time and resources. These states benefit from the
894 (describing how “electoral college strategies . . . can lead to discrepancies in the allocation of
campaign resources even among the battleground states”); John R. Wright, Pivotal states in the
Electoral College, 1880 to 2004, 139 PUB. C HOICE 21, 22 (2009) (finding that a state’s “pivot
position” was a “significant predictor of presidential candidates’ media buys and travel decisions in the
last two presidential elections”); Doherty, supra note 55, at 753 (hypothesizing that presidents’
“patterns of travel should favor populous, electorally competitive states”); Lipsitz, supra note 56, at 188
(examining whether the allocation of campaign resources in presidential campaigns affects political
participation of voters within competitive and noncompetitive states).
105 See Darshan J. Goux & David A. Hopkins, The Empirical Implications of Electoral College
Reform, 36 AM. POL. R ES. 857, 869 (2008) (finding that “[r]esources, principally time and money,
would remain limited” even under a direct vote); Doherty, supra note 55, at 754 (positing that where the
President decides to campaign is revealing because “time is perhaps his scarcest resource”).
106 See Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, Thinking About the Political Impacts of the Electoral
College, 123 PUB. C HOICE 1, 8 (2005) (assuming that “campaigners invest resources in influencing
voters so as to equalize the expected marginal gain in the probability of their winning the Electoral
College”); Wright, supra note 104, at 33 (arguing that “[s]ince candidates must win the pivotal state” to
win the election, his or her resources “will probably be distributed around the pivotal state”).
107 See Brams & Davis, supra note 104, at 117 (examining the amount of campaign time spent in
each state in relation to the population size of that state and finding that candidates target and favor the
states which will “maximiz[e] [his or her] expected electoral vote”).
108 See Wright, supra note 104, at 35 (“[B]oth size and competitiveness exert indirect effects via
pivot position on candidates’ decisions about where to campaign.”); Brams & Davis, supra note 104, at
131 (“Insofar as polls indicate the largest states to be the toss-up states, candidates who act on this
information and concentrate almost all of their resources in these states will magnify even the largestate bias . . . .”).
109 See U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (instructing that the number of electors in each state should
be equal to “the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress”).
110 See John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral
College, 13 VILL. L. R EV. 304, 313 (1968) (finding that “[t]he present Electoral College system, in
conjunction with state imposed unit-vote (“winner take all”) laws . . . greatly favors the citizens of the
most populous states and deprives citizens of the less populous states of an equal chance to affect the
election of the President.”); Brams & Davis, supra note 104, at 122 (“[W]hile an individual voter has a
reduced chance of influencing the outcome in a large state because of the greater number of people
voting, this reduction is more than offset by the larger number of electoral votes he can potentially
influence.”).
111 See Brams & Davis, supra note 104, at 123 (finding that “greater potential voting power of
voters in large states . . . makes them more attractive as campaign targets to the candidates” because the
state’s larger number of electoral votes provide a higher likelihood that it will affect the outcome of a
presidential election).
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“federalism bonus” which provides at least two electors to each state
regardless of its population.112 Nevertheless, they have relatively few
electoral votes and are less likely to play a significant role in the outcome
of the election.113 Moreover, if the state is uncompetitive, candidates may
also be hesitant to give it any appreciable campaign attention because it is
unlikely to provide additional votes.114
Although some researchers believe that a direct vote, like that
proposed in the NPV agreement, will eliminate power disparities between
individual voters and states,115 candidates’ limited resources will likely
continue to encourage uneven resource allocation.116 Candidates would
have to alter their campaign strategies to obtain the largest number of
individual votes on a national scale.117 The focus of campaign resources
would be adjusted from politically competitive states to both competitive
and uncompetitive states with areas of high population.118 Thus, spectator
states are more likely to pass the NPV agreement because they may gain
power under a national popular vote.
On the other hand, this implies that smaller competitive states would
likely lose power under the national popular vote. Candidates would not
expect as great of a return on their investment of resources in sparsely
populated regions and would likely reduce the amount of campaign
attention afforded to them.119 These states would be harmed by a national
112 The “federalism bonus” is the grant of two electors assigned to each state based not on
population, but on the number of Senate seats held by each state. See Adkins & Kirwan, supra note 56,
at 72–73. The idea was carried over to the Electoral College from the Great Compromise regarding the
composition of the Congress during the Constitutional Convention and reflects the founder’s effort to
balance political power between large and small states. Id. at 74–75; see also Lawrence D. Longley &
James D. Dana, Jr., The Biases of the Electoral College in the 1990s, 25 POLITY 123, 133 (1992)
(recognizing the increased voting power of residents of small states which “stems from the two electoral
votes that are not based on population”).
113 See Banzhaf, supra note 110, at 313 (“Citizens of the small and medium-sized states are
severely deprived of voting power in comparison with the residents of the few very populous
states . . . .”).
114 See Doherty, supra note 55, at 766 (finding that during campaign years, a closer margin of
victory in the previous election is a “statistically significant predictor[]” of more “presidential events”).
115 See Longley & Dana, supra note 112, at 137 (finding that because under a direct vote “each
citizen’s voting power is, by definition, equal,” it would be less biased than the “present electoral
college”); Banzhaf, supra note 110, at 321–22 (arguing that because “no distinction whatever is made
between votes cast by residents of different states,” the votes in each state would be of equal weight
under a direct vote).
116 See Goux & Hopkins, supra note 105, at 869 (arguing that “[c]andidates cannot realistically
compete everywhere or engage every voter; inevitably, each campaign would decide, just as now, to
direct resources toward some identifiable populations and not others.”).
117 See id. (suggesting that “[u]nder a system of direct popular election, candidates no longer have
reason to acknowledge state boundaries”).
118 See Eric M. Uslaner, Spatial Models of the Electoral College: Distribution Assumptions and
Biases of the System, 3 POL. M ETHODOLOGY 355, 361 (1976) (“The larger states would be favored
under direct election simply because they have more voters than smaller states.”).
119 See Goux & Hopkins, supra note 105, at 870 (examining the cost of campaign advertising and
finding that “[e]vidence indicates that [candidates under a popular vote] would follow much the same
strategy as they do today: attempt to maximize the number of persuadable, or swing, voters targeted per
dollar of advertising cost”).
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popular vote and would be the least likely to approve NPV legislation.
Further, if the NPV agreement reaches 270 electoral votes, the signatory
states alone will have enough electoral votes to successfully elect the
President regardless of the remaining states.120 While candidates would
still be concerned with obtaining the votes of individuals within these
nonmember states, voters in these states would effectively lose the
protections of the Electoral College including the federalism bonus.121
Therefore, by both altering strategy incentives and eliminating protections
for voting power under the Electoral College, the NPV agreement
horizontally encroaches on the power of non-signatory states while
increasing the voting power of member states.
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided Congress’s role when
compacts involve horizontal encroachment on the power of non-signatory
states.122 In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission,123 a compact
between states that regulated the taxing of multistate taxpayers was
challenged on constitutional grounds.124 The appellants sought injunctive
relief, arguing that the compact failed to receive congressional approval
and was thus invalid.125 Appellants also asserted that the compact
“impair[ed] the . . . rights of nonmember States” by “exert[ing] undue
pressure to join” the compact.126 The Court found insufficient support for
encroachment on nonmember states.127 Further, it held that the compact
did not require congressional consent because, based on Virginia v.
Tennessee,128 the compact did not “threaten[] federal supremacy.”129
Similarly, in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System,130 the Court considered the constitutionality of an
interstate compact that would lift the federal ban on interstate acquisitions

120 See supra Part I.A; see also supra text accompanying note 30 (describing the provision that
requires a majority of electoral votes before the agreement becomes effective).
121 See Adkins & Kirwan, supra note 56, at 84 (noting that due to the federalism bonus, “the
smaller states are well represented in the electoral college” and would likely oppose a shift to a direct
form of election).
122 Horizontal encroachment occurs when an interstate compact or agreement negatively affects
the power of states that are not parties to the agreement or compact. Under the Virginia v. Tennessee
test, the potential effect of compacts on nonmember states is ignored. See Va. v. Tenn., 148 U.S. 503,
519–20 (1893).
123 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
124 See id. at 456, 458 (indicating that the appellants brought claims under both the Compact
Clause and Commerce Clause).
125 Id. at 458.
126 Id. at 477.
127 Id. at 477–78 (“It has not been shown that any unfair taxation of multistate business resulting
from the disparate use of combination and other methods will redound to the benefit of any particular
group of States or to the harm of others. . . . Each member State is free to adopt the auditing procedures
it thinks best, just as it could if the Compact did not exist.”).
128 Va., 148 U.S. at 503.
129 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 476 (1978) (holding that
“[a]ppellees make no showing that increased effectiveness in the administration of state tax laws,
promoted by [the compact], threatens federal supremacy.”).
130 Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 159 (1985).
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of banks.131 Petitioners claimed that the compact was invalid for a lack of
congressional approval,132 and that it “impermissibly offend[ed] the
sovereignty of sister States.”133 The Court held that the compact was
incapable of interfering with federal power because any state law
conflicting with the federal ban would be preempted regardless of its
standing under the Compact Clause.134 The Court also found that the
petitioners failed to show encroachment upon the power of other states.135
There have been justices on the Court, though, that have supported the
need for congressional consent when a compact interferes with the power
of nonmember states. Justice White argued in his dissenting opinion in
U.S. Steel, “[a] proper understanding of what would encroach upon federal
authority . . . must also incorporate encroachments on the authority and
power of non-Compact States.”136 The opinion relied on pre-Virginia v.
Tennessee137 reasoning for inclusion of horizontal encroachment under the
Compact Clause,138 and the belief that “[a]s the constitutional arbiter of
political differences between States, the Congress is the proper body to
evaluate the extent of harm being imposed on non-Compact States . . . .”139
It is possible, then, that if faced with an interstate compact which alters the
distribution of power among states as the NPV agreement does, the Court
may be persuaded to require congressional approval in cases of horizontal
encroachment.
III. CHOOSING A THEORY OF ENCROACHMENT
In determining whether the NPV agreement should require
congressional consent, a constitutional conflict arises between Article II
and the Compact Clause. On the one hand, Article II gives Congress no
power to oversee the method by which states choose electors.140 On the
other hand, the Compact Clause requires congressional consent for all
interstate compacts.141 Because the NPV agreement involves both the
131 See id. at 163–64 (explaining that several New England states passed reciprocal legislation
within their region allowing interstate bank acquisitions).
132 Id. at 175 (reporting that the petitioners argued that the compact “violate[d] the Compact
Clause . . . because Congress has not specifically approved it”).
133 Id. at 176.
134 See id.
135 See id. (“We do not see how the statutes in question either enhance the political power of the . .
. States at the expense of other States or have an ‘impact on our federal structure.’” (quoting U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978))).
136 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 494 (White, J., dissenting).
137 Va. v. Tenn., 148 U.S. 503, 503 (1893).
138 See U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 494 (“[T]his Court held that the purpose of requiring the submission
to Congress of a compact . . . between two States was ‘to guard against the derangement of their federal
relations with the other states of the Union, and the federal government . . . .’” (quoting R.I. v. Mass.,
12 Pet. 657, 726 (1838))).
139 See id. at 496.
140 See U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1 (giving Congress the power to decide the day and time for the
selection of electors in each state, but giving the power to determine the method of selecting the electors
to the states alone).
141 See U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting states, “without the Consent of Congress,” from
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selection of electors and an interstate compact, the proper role of Congress
is uncertain. This Part explores this conflict and ultimately proposes a
resolution. Section A below discusses the argument in favor of
maintaining the exclusive Article II power of the states. Then Section B
explores the counter argument for requiring congressional approval under
the Compact Clause. In the end, because the NPV agreement involves both
meaningful encroachment on the power of nonmember states and fits under
the broad language of the Compact Clause, it should require congressional
approval before becoming a valid and enforceable interstate compact.
A.

State Power Under Article II
Article II provides that state legislatures may appoint state electors in
any manner that they may choose.142 Proponents of the NPV agreement
argue that this provision allows individual states to constitutionally select
electors through an interstate compact without congressional consent.143
An examination of both the intent of the Framers and judicial interpretation
reveal that Article II does grant states broad power to select their electors,
subject only to time and qualification limitations.
The election of the executive was among the most contentious issues
facing the Framers in constructing the United States Constitution.144 With
regard to federal legislative power, compromise was reached between large
and small states by the creation of a bicameral legislature designed to
protect smaller states from being overwhelmed by the more populous
states.145 A similar issue arose with regard to the election of the
executive.146 Unlike the bicameral legislature, there was no clear way to
balance the interests of large and small states when electing a single person
charged with representing all citizens.147 Three methods were proposed

entering into any agreement or compact with another state).
142 See U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
143 See KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 285; Matthew Pincus, When Should Interstate Compacts
Require Congressional Consent?, 42 C OLUM . J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 511, 521 (2009) (“The NPV’s
proponents emphasize that Congressional consent is not required for the compact to be found valid by
the courts.”).
144 See LEONARD W. LEVY & D ENNIS J. M AHONEY , THE FRAMING AND R ATIFICATION OF
THE C ONSTITUTION 129 (1987) (“[T]he Committee of Unfinished Business (or on Postponed Parts)
untangled the convention’s last remaining snarls, the knottiest of which was certainly the long-debated
question of a sound executive.”); see also PAULINE M AIER , R ATIFICATION : T HE P EOPLE DEBATE
THE C ONSTITUTION , 1787–1788 114 (2010) (noting that when asked, James Wilson, a representative
from Pennsylvania, indicated that the issue of election of the President was the most difficult for the
Framers to resolve).
145 See LEVY & MAHONEY, supra note 144, at 129. (“[Large and small states] each secured
supremacy in one house of the Congress.”).
146 See Slonim, supra note 8, at 37 (explaining that “at the very outset of the convention, the large
and small states were at loggerheads over the method of selecting the executive no less than they were
over the composition of the legislature” because both plans called for election of the executive by the
legislature).
147 See LEVY & MAHONEY, supra note 144, at 129 (indicating that “both the small and the large
states had proved determined not to give the other a predominant advantage in selecting the chief
magistrate” and “fear of an elective monarchy and strong objections to election either by the people or
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and considered by the Framers: election by the national legislature; popular
vote; and election by state electors.148
First, election by the legislature was proposed as a national reflection
of the common practice in the states permitting the state legislatures to
elect individuals for public office and because it allowed the most
knowledgeable citizens to choose the executive.149 It was rejected,
however, due to concerns for separation of powers and presidential
independence.150 The members of the Convention favored election by the
people.151 Nonetheless, the popular vote was ultimately dismissed because,
as Virginia delegate George Mason explained, “[t]he extent of the Country
renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity to
judge of the respective pretensions of the Candidates.”152
The Electoral College was ultimately selected, though not without
controversy.153 The plan had the benefit of preserving the independence of
the states had brought the meeting to an impasse”).
148 See J ACK . N. R AKOVE , O RIGINAL M EANINGS : P OLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE M AKING OF
THE C ONSTITUTION 259 (1997); KOZA ET AL ., supra note 3, at 38 (“The Constitutional Convention
considered a variety of methods for electing the President and Vice President . . . .”).
149 See Slonim, supra note 8, at 37 (discussing the fact that both the New Jersey Plan and the
Virginia Plan proposed election by the legislature, “as was the practice in all but three of the states”);
RAKOVE, supra note 148, at 259 (describing election by the legislature as “[t]he most obvious
alternative” for the Framers because it “plac[ed] the decision in the nation’s most knowledgeable
leaders”); SAUL K. P ADOVER , TO SECURE THESE B LESSINGS : THE GREAT DEBATES OF THE
C ONSTITUTIONAL C ONVENTION OF 1787 349 (1962) (“[T]he sense of the nation would be better
expressed by the legislature than by the people at large.”).
150 FORREST M C D ONALD , A C ONSTITUTIONAL H ISTORY OF THE U NITED S TATES 28 (1986)
(“Having Congress elect the president would be a convenient way, but that would make the executive
branch dependent upon the legislative.”). The Framers feared that this plan would result in the President
becoming a mere puppet of the legislature. RAKOVE, supra note 148, at 259 (acknowledging that one of
the fundamental concerns of the Framers was to “enable the executive to resist legislative
encroachments,” and election by the national legislature would “produce a pliable official”). The
President’s re-eligibility for office was also of concern to many of the Framers under the legislative
option. LEVY & MAHONEY, supra note 144, at 129 (“[T]he desire to make it possible for the executive
to succeed himself, had seriously discredited appointment by the Congress.”); Slonim, supra note 8, at
37–38 (explaining that the issue of reelection of the President was one of three concerns regarding
election of the executive that “formed a sort of tripod where an imbalance on one side disrupted the
balance of the whole”).
151 PADOVER, supra note 149, at 346–47 (noting that Wilson, the first to voice his opinion on the
matter of electing the President, supported election by the people); RAKOVE, supra note 148, at 259
(“Morris, Wilson, and Madison boldly endorsed [election by the people] on principle.”).
152 See 2 THE R ECORDS OF THE FEDERAL C ONVENTION OF 1787 31 (Max Ferrand ed., 1911).
The Framers also feared that the people would “naturally prefer citizens from their own states,”
preventing a popular vote from ever producing the requisite majority. RAKOVE, supra note 148, at 259;
see also PADOVER, supra note 149, at 349. In addition, direct election by the people had the potential to
create instability in the national government and would necessarily favor the North as there would be
far more eligible voters from the North than from the South. LEVY & MAHONEY, supra note 144, at
128–29 (“The vigor and stability demanded by the Pennsylvanians seemed incompatible to some with
popular election . . . .”); see also WOODY HOLTON , U NRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
C ONSTITUTION 188–89 (2007) (discussing James Madison’s belief that the electoral system gave
southern states more weight because slaves would be counted to determine the number of state electors
while a direct election by the people would include only white voters, leaving southern states without
this extra weight).
153 Some of the Framers feared that a meeting of the electors would be impractical. See RAKOVE,
supra note 148, at 260 (indicating that the Framers “questioned the inconvenience and expense of
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the presidency from the Legislature, alleviating concerns over separation of
powers.154 The Framers were also able to preserve the balance of power
between large and small states by incorporating the benefits of the Great
Compromise.155 Like the election of Senators and Representatives,156 the
selection of electors was left to the states.157 The Electoral College was
unique, however, in that the method for electing the electors was left to
each state.158 It has been argued that the Framers expected that states
would select electors on a district-wide basis.159 Today, all but two states
choose electors under a winner-take-all unit rule based on the outcome of a
gathering electors from distant states”). Others argued that selection by the Senate, as was originally
contemplated in the event of a tie in the Electoral College, favored small states at the expense of larger
states. See LEVY & MAHONEY, supra note 144, at 130 (noting that the larger states proposed that the
power of the Senate to choose the President should be limited due to the disproportionate power given
to the small states under the proposed plan). Still others worried that the plan would produce separation
of powers issues between the executive and the legislative branches if the Senate were allowed to
choose the President in the event of a tie. See id. (noting that because the Senate and executive shared
the power to enter into treaties and make appointments, allowing the Senate to determine the outcome
of the election might “encourage these two branches to combine against the lower house”).
154 See THE F EDERALIST N O . 68, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the Framers desired
that “the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office, on all, but the people
themselves” and that this would be accomplished by “making his re-election to depend on a special
body of Representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important
choice”); see also LEVY & MAHONEY, supra note 144, at 129–30 (discussing the Framers’ belief that
“[r]eliance on electors . . . would ‘get rid of the ineligibility’ for reelection, which had seemed
inseparable from an election by Congress”); Kevin J. Coleman et al., The Election Process in the United
States, in THE ELECTION PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 41 (Albert Nicosia ed., 2003) (noting that
preventing Congress from interfering in elections “was intended to preserve the independence of the
Presidency”); RAKOVE, supra note 148, at 259–60 (positing that some Framers favored this plan due to
“the support it gave to those who thought that eligibility for reelection would give the executive an
important incentive to maintain his independence” and due to the plan’s prevention of the executive
becoming “toady” to Congress’ demands).
155 See U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (instructing that the number of electors appointed by each
state be “equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled
in the Congress”); THE FEDERALIST NO . 68, at 375 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[E]ach state shall choose a
number of persons as electors, equal to the number of Senators and Representatives of such State in the
National Government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President.”).
The Great Compromise sought to balance legislative power between the large and small states by
combining two plans proposed at the Constitutional Convention. The Virginia Plan benefitted large
states through proportional representation in the legislature, while the New Jersey Plan protected the
interests of small states by providing only one vote per state for equal representation. See Slonim, supra
note 8, at 37. In the end, the Framers adopted a bicameral legislature in which the members of the lower
house would be chosen through proportional representation and each state would be given an equal vote
in the upper house. 2 THE R ECORDS OF THE FEDERAL C ONVENTION OF 1787, 29 (Max Ferrand, ed.,
1966).
156 See U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (requiring that members of the House of Representatives be
“chosen every second Year by the People of the several States); U.S. C ONST . art. XVII (commanding
that Senators be elected by the people from each state).
157 See U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (indicating that “each State shall appoint” the electors
allotted to it).
158 See U.S. C ONST . art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (allowing each state to select its electors in “such Manner as
[it] may direct”).
159 See Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), in T HE FOUNDERS ’
C ONSTITUTION 556, 557 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1986) (indicating that “[t]he district
mode was mostly, if not exclusively in view when the Constitution was framed and adopted; & was
exchanged for the general ticket & the legislative election, as the only expedient for baffling the policy
of the particular States which had set the example.”).
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statewide vote.160 The Framers also expected that the electors would act
independently once selected to vote for the candidates they found to be the
most qualified.161 However, electors generally choose candidates based
solely on party loyalty.162
Courts have interpreted Article II to give states the power to select
electors free from congressional oversight.163 In McPherson v. Blacker,164
presidential nominees challenged a Michigan law regarding selection of
electors to the Electoral College.165 The law provided that each
congressional district would elect one elector and one alternate elector.166
The two remaining electors allotted to the state and their alternates were to
be chosen by the electors elected from the congressional districts making
up the eastern and western Electoral Districts.167 The Court held that the
legislation was valid because “Congress is empowered to determine the
time of choosing the electors and the day on which they are to give their
votes . . . but otherwise the power and jurisdiction of the State is
exclusive.”168 The Court also held that this power did not cease to exist
simply because the mode adopted had not followed the original
expectations of the Framers.169
Nevertheless, in more recent decisions, the Court has consistently held
that the broad powers granted under Article II are limited by the other

160 See Festa, supra note 53, at 2126 (noting that currently, “forty-eight states plus the District of
Columbia use the unit rule”). Maine and Nebraska use a district system in which voters in each of the
state’s congressional districts vote for one elector, with the remaining electors chosen based on the
statewide plurality winner. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election of the President: Using or
Abusing the Electoral College?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 218, 222 (2009) (finding that the unit-rule voting
system is used in every state except Maine and Nebraska, which use district voting); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 802 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1038 (LexisNexis 1994).
161 See THE FEDERALIST N O . 64 (Alexander Hamilton) (postulating that because electors “will in
general be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that
their attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most
distinguished by their abilities and virtues”); see also KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 43 (indicating that
the Framers believed the electors would “exercise independent and detached judgment” in choosing a
President and Vice President).
162 See KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 44 (reporting that from the very first contested presidential
election, electors have been chosen “to register the will of the appointing power” (quoting McPherson
v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892))).
163 See supra text accompanying note 92.
164 McPherson, 146 U.S. at 1.
165 See id. at 2–4 (identifying the plaintiffs as presidential nominees seeking to nullify the state
legislation outlining the method for selecting Michigan electors).
166 See id. at 5 (indicating that each district would elect one “district elector” and one “alternate
district elector” (quoting 1891 Mich. Pub. Acts 50)).
167 See id. at 4 (“There shall be elected by the electors of the districts hereinafter defined one
elector of President and Vice President of the United States in each district . . . there shall also be
elected in like manner two alternate electors of President and Vice President . . . .” (quoting 1891 Mich.
Pub. Acts 50)).
168 Id. at 35.
169 See id. at 36 (“[W]e can perceive no reason for holding that the power confided to the States by
the Constitution has ceased to exist because the operation of the system has not fully realized the hopes
of those by whom it was created.”).
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provisions of the Constitution.170 In Williams v. Rhodes, the Court
considered an Ohio law requiring new parties to obtain petitions from
enough supporters to equal fifteen percent of the voters in the previous
gubernatorial election.171 The Ohio American Independent Party and the
Socialist Labor Party claimed that the law denied the parties and their
supporters the equal protection of the laws by effectively preventing new
parties from appearing on the ballot.172 The Court held that although
Article II “grant[s] extensive power to the States to pass laws regulating the
selection of electors . . . these granted powers are always subject to the
limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other
specific provisions of the Constitution.”173 Thus, the power of the states to
choose electors is not unlimited.
Based on the text of Article II and the Framer’s intent, the NPV
agreement seems to be a valid exercise of state power free from
congressional interference. The Framers specifically rejected legislative
selection of the President, wishing to preserve separation of powers
between the executive and legislative branches.174
Instead, the
Constitutional Convention approved the exclusive state power embodied in
Article II, due, in large part, to its ability to preserve the independence of
the President from Congress.175 It is clear, then, that were signatory states
to select electors based on a national popular vote of their own, Congress
would have no power to oversee that decision under Article II.176 The NPV

170 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (holding that the power of the states to select
electors could not “be exercised in such a way as to violate express constitutional commands”).
Specifically, the Court has limited the power of states to choose electors in a manner that denies its
residents equal protection of the laws. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (reasoning that
“[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and
disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another” (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966))); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (using a balancing test
that weighs the “character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against state interests which “make it
necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights”); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 141 (1972) (applying the
rule that the state’s power over elections “must be exercised in a manner consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (citing Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 89)); Hitson v. Baggett,
446 F. Supp. 674, 676 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (holding that “a state is free, under the Constitution, to conduct
elections on a statewide or at-large basis so long as the electoral system it establishes does not ‘operate
to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of [minority voters].’” (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379
U.S. 433, 439 (1965))).
171 See Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 24–25 (describing the requirements for parties to join the presidential
race under § 3517.01 of the Ohio Revised Code).
172 See id. at 25 (finding that the Ohio law made it “virtually impossible for any party to qualify on
the ballot except the Republican and Democratic Parties”).
173 Id. at 29.
174 See supra text accompanying notes 168–169.
175 See supra text accompanying note 173.
176 See U.S. C ONST . art II, § 1, cl. 2 (granting state legislatures the power to choose electors “in
such Manner as [they] . . . may direct”); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (describing the
power of the states to choose electors as exclusive and “so framed [in the Constitution] that
Congressional and Federal influence might be excluded”); see also infra text accompanying notes 186–
187 (describing the states’ power over the mode for selecting electors as plenary).
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agreement, proponents argue, is only an exercise of states’ Article II
powers.177
Under Williams, however, the NPV agreement must not violate any
other constitutional provisions.178 Therefore, the broad power given to
states by Article II does not preclude application of the Compact Clause to
the selection of electors under the NPV agreement.
B.

The Compact Clause and Limitations on State Power
The Compact Clause, in contrast to Article II, gives Congress the
power to oversee states’ ability to enter into enforceable agreements or
compacts.179 Whether the NPV agreement requires congressional approval
is an open question. The historical context of the Clause suggests that
compacts with no appreciable effect on nonparties should be accepted.180
But when a compact involves meaningful encroachment, the text of the
Clause may require the consent of Congress.
Interstate compacts have been subject to government regulation since
colonial times.181 Under British rule, colonies could enter into agreements
with one another with the approval of the Crown.182 If an agreement could
not be reached, the colonies could litigate the matter before a Royal
Commission appointed by the Crown.183 The framers of the Articles of
Confederation were also suspicious of interstate agreements, fearing they
might create entities destructive or capable of competing with the
Confederation.184 Therefore, states could not “enter into any treaty,

177 See KOZA ET AL., supra note 3, at 284–85 (arguing that because the Constitution gives “each
state the power to select the manner of appointing its presidential electors . . . the subject matter of the
[NPV agreement] is a state power and an appropriate subject for an interstate compact”).
178 See infra text accompanying note 192.
179 See U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (requiring congressional approval for any interstate compact
or agreement).
180 See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 688 (1925) (indicating that compacts are useful in resolving
disputes that “transcend State lines,” are “beyond the power of Congress and where . . . diversity of
treatment is an interstate evil”); Adam Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform, 40 AKRON
L. REV. 717, 739 (2007) (indicating that an interstate agreement has not been invalidated by courts for
lack of congressional consent in over 100 years because they have not been found to be “within the
ambit of the Compact Clause”).
181 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 180, at 692 (“[T]he Compact Clause has its roots deep in
colonial history. It is part and parcel of the long and familiar story of colonial boundary
controversies.”); see also Hollis, supra note 69, at 760 (explaining that colonies resolved boundary
disputes through intercolonial agreements “more than one hundred years before the American
Revolution”).
182 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 180, at 692–93 n.29 (indicating that the Massachusetts
officials were required to submit an agreement with New York to the King for approval); Hollis, supra
note 69, at 760 (indicating that intercolonial agreements required the Crown’s approval).
183 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 180, at 692–93 (“If negotiations failed . . . [there] was an
appeal to the Crown, followed normally by a reference of the controversy to a Royal Commission. In
effect such a controversy before a Royal Commission bore the characteristics of a litigation.”).
184 See id. at 693–94 (indicating that the interstate compact provision in the Articles of
Confederation limited the power of the states to “protect the new Union of States”).
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confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of
the United States in congress assembled.”185
The Constitution is unique from its predecessors in that it
differentiates between a “treaty, confederations or alliance” and an
“agreement or compact.”186 The former are completely forbidden to states
under the Constitution.187 The latter, however, mirror the British model.
Rather than requiring approval of the Crown, agreements and compacts
between states require congressional approval, and like the Royal
Commissions, disputes that cannot be resolved may be heard by the
Supreme Court.188 However, since the ratification of the Constitution,
many interstate compacts have been accepted despite a lack of
congressional approval.189 Until 1921, Congress had approved only thirtysix compacts,190 and those that were approved, often involved disputes
similar in kind to those which were accepted despite a lack of consent.191
In addition, since the Supreme Court’s 1893 decision in Virginia v.
Tennessee, no interstate compact has been successfully challenged for lack
of congressional consent.192
There are strong arguments for accepting interstate compacts that can
have no meaningful effect on nonmember states.193 In a 1925 study of the
rising use of interstate compacts, Frankfurter and Landis argued that
compacts have been useful in resolving interstate disputes that are difficult
or impossible to litigate.194 For example, on-going interstate conflicts like
185 See ARTICLES OF C ONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 2 (“No two or more states shall
enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the
United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purpose for which the same is to be
entered into, and how long it shall continue.”).
186 See Schleifer, supra note 180, at 729 (indicating that the Constitution creates a dichotomy
between “treaties, alliances, and federations” and “agreements and compacts”); see also JOSEPH
STORY, C OMMENTARIES ON THE C ONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1397 (1st ed. 1833)
(speculating that the Framers, through the two sets of terms, sought to distinguish political treaties from
agreements that are “mere private rights of sovereignty”).
187 See U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation . . . .”); Hollis, supra note 69, at 761 (indicating that treaties, confederation or alliance
between states are “prohibit[ed] entirely” under the Constitution).
188 See U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (discussing the congressional approval requirement for
interstate agreements or compacts); U.S. C ONST art. III, § 2 (granting original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court in resolving any dispute in which a state is a party); see also Frankfurter & Landis,
supra note 180, at 694 (“Historically the consent of Congress, as a prerequisite to the validity of
agreements by States, appears as the republican transformation of the needed approval by the Crown.”).
189 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 180, at 749–55 (describing eleven interstate compacts
between 1803 and 1909 which never received the consent of Congress, but were accepted as valid).
190 See Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 M O . L. R EV . 285,
288 (2003).
191 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 180, at 735–55 (summarizing both compacts receiving
congressional consent and those that were accepted without consent prior to 1925).
192 See Greve, supra note 190, at 289.
193 See, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 180, at 729 (“The imaginative adaptation of the
compact idea should add considerably to resources available to statesmen in the solution of problems
presented by the growing interdependence, social and economic, of groups of States forming distinct
regions.”).
194 See id. at 704–05 (identifying two areas in which compacts have proven useful: when the
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waste disposal and boundary disputes require a kind of “[c]ontinuous and
creative administration” which the courts are unable to provide.195
Frankfurter and Landis also acknowledged the fact that states can use
compacts to deal with regional issues.196 Because these conflicts involve a
specific group of states, resolution would require action by more than a
single state.197 Alternatively, federal legislation would be burdensome and
excessive because it would require only regional enforcement.198 These
findings suggest that if they affect only member states, interstate compacts
may present an efficient and often necessary alternative method of state
regulation and should not require congressional interference.
However, compacts affecting the power of nonmember states should
require congressional consent. While the necessity of consent in instances
of horizontal encroachment is unclear from Supreme Court precedent, such
compacts harm the balance of power between states, posing a risk to the
entire federal system.199 In these cases, congressional approval can be used
to protect the interests of both the federal government and the nation as a
whole.200 The NPV agreement represents this kind of compact.201 Under
the NPV agreement, candidates will be forced to reduce the attention given
to sparsely populated states and increase the amount of time and resources
spent in areas of high population.202 In addition, competitive states
previously favored in traditional presidential campaigns will lose voting
power as candidates will have greater incentive to broaden their campaigns
in order to reach a larger number of individual voters.203 Thus,
congressional consent is required to preserve the balance of state power in
presidential elections.

“range, the intricacy, [or] the technicality of the facts [ ] make a court a very ill-adapted instrument for
settlement,” and when the dispute is “wholly beyond the process of adjudication”).
195 See id. at 707.
196 See id. (arguing that “most questions of interstate concern are beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court” because “regions, like the Southwest clustering about the Colorado River, or the States
dependent upon the Delaware for water,” are “less than the nation and are greater than any one State”).
197 See id. (finding that a solution to regional issues must “be greater than that at the disposal of a
single State”).
198 See id. at 708 (noting that while national action may be an alternative to action by a single
state, the “regional interests, regional cultures and regional interdependencies . . . produce regional
problems calling for regional solutions” and “a gratuitous burden would thereby be cast upon Congress
and the national administration” in an effort to control the issue).
199 See FREDERICK L. Z IMMERMAN & M ITCHELL WENDELL, THE L AW AND U SE OF
INTERSTATE C OMPACTS 23 (1976) (noting that although they could find no examples, “compacts
which might be said to have a discriminatory effect upon nonparty states could be described as affecting
the political balance of the federal system”); see also Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 180, at 695
(arguing that interstate agreements or compacts “may affect the interests of States other than those
parties to the agreement,” thus “national, and not merely regional, interest may be involved”).
200 See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 180, at 695 (arguing that in the case of horizontal
encroachment, “Congress must exercise national supervision through its power to grant or withhold
consent, or to grant it under appropriate conditions”).
201 See supra Part II.C.
202 See id.
203 See id.
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CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that Article II grants state legislatures broad control
over the selection of presidential electors largely free from federal
intervention. It is equally clear from the text of the Compact Clause that
any agreement or compact between states must receive the consent of
Congress. The NPV agreement involves both provisions, highlighting a
constitutional conflict that leaves the proper role of Congress and the
validity of the agreement in question. This issue is further complicated by
the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court regarding the necessity of
congressional consent when a compact like the NPV agreement
horizontally encroaches upon the power of nonmember states. While these
questions remain open, this article has argued that because it will upset the
balance of voting power between the states and thus threaten the federal
structure designed by the Framers, the NPV agreement must receive
congressional approval before becoming effective.

